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The Seashore and the People
WINTHROP TAYLORt
This article attempts an exposition of adjudicated rights in and to
that portion of the land between high and low tidewater, technically
known as the foreshore and popularly as the seashore. Broadly
speaking, the discussion is limited to the law of this (New York)
state and the locus in quo is practically confined to the Long Island
littoral. Probably nowhere have the questions involved assumed
such importance as in the vicinity of the Greater City of New York-
questions perplexing alike to administrators charged with the pro-
tection of public interests, to lawyers in advising their clients, and,
particularly, to judges in their efforts to arrive at decisions at once
just and harmonious. The task of the latter has been made peculiar-
ly difficult by an increasing social impact; tremendous populations,
already crowding, continue to augment, while nature has limited for
all time the extent of the seashore. It follows that m modem times
emphasis has fallen upon that aspect of it involving the public use
and enjoyment of the beach. While the investigation is primarily
that of the cases, research takes us back to Saxon England and the
ancient law of the manor, through the history of the struggle between
Charles the First and his subjects, across the Atlantic and the settle-
ment of the New World, to present day industrialism with its teeming
cities and the consequent pressure of a collective philosophy on the
judicial process.
About three hundred years ago Long Island began to be colonized.
Both the Dutch and English patents embraced large tracts of land.
Some of these grants ran to individuals, others to groups aspiring to
found a community or township. Many of these grants were bounded
by Long Island Sound on the north or the Atlantic Ocean on the
south or by both.' These conveyances were most comprehensive,
including not merely the land, but rivers and inlets, extensive har-
bors and bays, estuaries both of sea and sound where the rise and fall
of the tide has caused countless beaches. An appurtenance clause, or
one similar, commonly found in the grants is as follows :2
"TOGETHER with all the lands, soyles, woods, meadows,
pastures, marshes, lakes, waters, fishing, hawking, hunting and
tOf the New York Bar.
'The grants to the towns of Hempstead, Huntington, and Brookhaven all run
from sea to sound. Thompson, History of Long Island.2Grant of Governor Andross to Richard Smith, March 25, 1677, known as the
Smithtown Patent. Thompson, supra, at p. 454.
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fowling and all other profits, commodities and emoluments to
the said parcells of land and premises belonging; with their and
every of their appurtenances and every part and parcell thereof."
These grants, extravagant if viewed in the light of the present,
were necessary inducements to colonization especially where the
venturers had to cross thousands of miles of ocean in sailing ships
while the land, the spoils of discovery, was in abundant supply.
Since those days of much land and a few people livig close to the
soil, largely on the bounties of nature, a profound change has taken
place. The invention of machinery, the era of factories, and the
quantity production of goods has so augmented the growth of urban
populations that, to-day, at the western end of Long Island millions
of people are densely concentrated and rapidly increasing. To this
mass of humanity, steam, electric, and gas engines have brought into
close proximity the outlying sections of Long Island-places that
were once distant a day's or a week's travel are now but a few hours
away.3 With large cities and modern transit facilities have come
other products of the industrial machine--a shorter work day, in-
creased leisure, and a diffused prosperity, so that recreation is the
standing order in countless urban families for summer week-ends.
During this period hundreds of thousands of sojourners leave the city
by train and motor car, and picnicking and bathing along the seashore
have assumed vastly popular aspects. The beaches of the sinuous
Long Island coast, once lonely and remote, offer easy and inviting
respite to city dwellers escaping from the monotony of a highly
mechanized existence. It is but natural to use and enjoy what lies
before them without hesitating over abstruse questions of ownership.
The result is an invasion, constantly growing, of privacy and what
have heretofore been assumed to be the exclusive privileges of private
ownership. The questions are both pressing and complex, involving
a history of three hundred years of litigation. Who owns these
salt water beaches; the state, the towns, or private persons? What is
the character of the ownership, and what are the corresponding rights
and privileges? Are they exclusive? Must they be shared, and if so,
by whom and under what circumstances? And, in the legal deter-
mination of such questions, by what tests or principles shall we be
3The first stage route through Long Island was established in 1772, taking two
days to make that part of the trip between Smithtown and Brooklyn, now made
in less than two hours. Fifty years ago it was a day's buggy ride (to and from)
the then city of Brooklyn to the seashore at Coney Island, consisting of unfre-
quented sand dunes and a few fishermen's shacks; the trip to-day is made by
electric train in thirty minutes, and during the summer millions of people visit the
beach.
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guided? What was the ancient law, what is its history, what is its
present status and what is a proper restatement?
THE ANCIENT HISTORY or THE FORESHORE. AN APPURTENANCE
Or THE ADJACENT UPLAND
Modem legal scholarship 4 has demonstrated that in ancient Eng-
land, both in Saxon times and after the Norman conquest, the ad-
jacent upland owner, the Lord of the Manor, both by express charter
and by clear implication owned the land between high and low water
mark. This rule of property is revealed by Saxon and Norman
records, and it existed unquestioned until the reign of Elizabeth, a
period of at least seven hundred years;5 it is analagous to the general
rule, still existing, that where property was bounded by a non-tidal
stream title carries to the center thereof.6 Co-existant with this pri-
vate ownership of the foreshore there was an equally well recognized
common law right in favor of the public to pass in boats over the
navigable waters, including those over the foreshore when the tide
was in.7 These two rights were not in conflict. When the tide was
out and the beach left dry, the upland owner had the use thereof;
when the tide was in and the beach was covered with water, the public
could pass thereover in boats. The first incident of title to private
property, the latter was a public easement of navigation, analagous
to passage over the highway.
In 1569, during the reign of Elizabeth, one Thomas Digges wrote a
treatise entitled "Proofs of the Queen's Interest in Lands left by the
Sea and the Salt Shores thereof", which asserted that the title to the
foreshore instead of being in the adjacent manorial owners was
prima facie in the crown.8 This theory rested upon the assumption
that the soil of England's coasts between high and low water mark had
never been granted. It ignored entirely the records of Saxon char-
ters, confirmed by Norman crown grants, including the beach as an
appurtenance of the adjacent upland and carrying title to low water
mark.9 Digges obtained grants from the crown of shore lands and
then instituted proceedings to recover possession from their owners.
4Moore, History and Law of the Foreshore and Seashore.51dem.6Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v. State of New York, 200 N. Y. 400, 414-
415 (1911); as to large non-tidal bodies of water title carries to low watermark,
Stewart v. Turney, 237 N. Y. 117, 122-123 (1923). Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. I.,
7Williams v. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. (Eng.) 314, 333 (1838); Gould, The Law of
Waters, sec. 53; Hale, De Jure Mais.
"Moore, supra, n. 4.9ldem, p. 184.
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His efforts were uniformly unsuccessful' O and he died in i595 a
defeated claimant. His theory was expressly repudiated in two early
English cases affirming the rule that the foreshore belonged to the
upland owner."
THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS. THE ASSAULT ON PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF THE FoREsHoRE
The litigious activity commenced by Digges was continued by
James I and received fresh impetus when Charles Stuart became
King of England.la With him the theory of the divine right of
kings attained a highly practical application, and the rejected con-
tention of the deceased Digges advocating a royal ownership of the
shore lands engaged the personal interest of Charles. Financially
hard pressed, and resorting to every device,2 one of his methods of
raising money was through the sale of commissions involving both the
foreshore and fishery rights in the navigable waters. Up to this time
the courts had consistently refused to recognize the title claim of the
crown. In 1628 Charles and his ministers contrived to get the ques-
tion presented before a selected bench in the case of Attorney-General
.'Philpot.3 The case involved the removal of a pier erected upon the
shore of the Thames River by the adjacent upland owner, the king
contending that he owned the title to the foreshore and that the
structure was a trespass or purpresture. On the first hearing Chief
Baron Walter said:-''Prima facie and of common right those who
have land adjoining to the said river or any river which ebbs and
flows, shall have all the land to the low water mark, and it shall be
intended to belong to those who have the land upon each side."
This reaffirmed the time-honored rule that the upland owner owned
the title to the foreshore and did not fit in with the king's purposes;
there was a re-hearing, meanwhile Baron Walter being removed from
the bench. Baron Denham in giving judgment for the king, stated
that he "has interest in a navigable river as high as the sea flows and
reflows, and the reason is, because such river partakes of the nature
of the sea, and is called an arm of the sea as high as it flows, and the
King has the sole interest in the soil of such rivers." The judges
participating in this decision were favored appointees of the king,"4
1 0Idem., ch. xi.
nSir John Constable's Case, I7 Eliz. (1575), Anderson 86; Sir Henry Constable's
Case, 43 Eliz. (16oi), 5 Co. Rep. io6.
nlaMoore, supra, n. 4, P. 25812Green, History of the English People, vol. 3.
laExtensively reported only in Moore, supra, n. 4., P. 262 et seg.14Some of the same judges sat in the famous Ship-money case against Hampden
and were later impeached by the House of Lords. Moore, supra, p. 279.
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and the pleadings themselves set forth that the action was brought to
augment the revenues of the crown. 5 The doubtful decision in the.
Philpot case, however, was not followed up, the king being defeated
in further attempts, 8 and shortly thereafter the Grand Remonstrance
of 1641 was brought against him. So notorious had been Charles'
efforts to gain control of the foreshore that Article 26 of the Remon-
strance charges him "with the taking away of men's rights under color
of the King's title to land between high and low water mark." The
Rebellion followed, Charles lost his head, and thus was brought to a
definite end this royal effort to snatch the seashore from its owners.
LoRD HALE'S WRITINGS. THE PERPETUATION OF THE THEORY
OF THE KING'S TITLE TO THE FoREISHoRE
It is an entirely reasonable supposition that the theory that the
king owned the foreshore in opposition to the ancient rule that it
accompanied the title to the adjacent upland would not have sur-
vived either in English or American jurisprudence had it not been
for the authorship of Lord Matthew Hale.'7 Up to the time of the
American Revolution, excepting the unreported Philpot case, there
are no English cases definitely holding that the foreshore was owned
not by the upland proprietor but by the crown. 8 While at the bar
Lord Hale had acted as counsel for the crown in shore front cases,
subsequently becoming Lord Chief Justice of England. He died in
x676, and his treatise "De Jure Maris" was not published until 1787,
twelve years after the battle of Lexington. With reference to the
title to the foreshore the treatise states that it
* * * doth prima face and of common right, belong to the
King, both in the shore of the sea and the shore of the arms of
the sea. * * * It is admitted that 'de jure communi' between the
high-water and low-water mark doth prima facie belong to the
King. Although it is true, that such shore may be and commonly
is parcel of the manor adjacent, and so may be belonging to a
subject, as shall be shown, yet primafacie it is the king's** **",9
1SSupra, n. 13.
16Moore, supra, p. 281.
3"In Attorney-General v. London, 8 Beav. (Eng.) 270 (1845), Sergeant Mere-
wether states in his argument that there is no basis for the claim of crown owner-
ship of the foreshore against the upland owner, in Saxon charters or laws, Dooms-
day Book, Laws of William I or Henry I, Glanville Magna Charta, Bracton,
Britton, the Year Books, or any other authority down to the time of James I. The
argument is published in Appendia to Hall on Seashore (2d ed.), and is accepted
byFarnham, Waters, vol. i, sec. 39; Gould, Waters (3d ed.), sec. 18, andby Moore,
supra. The latter shows that practically all the land on the seacoast of England
had been granted by the crown in Saxon and Norman times, and that the shore
was regarded as part of the grants.
"
8Riggs, Alienability of the Foreshore, 12 Col. L. Rev. 402.9Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. iv, sub. ii; Hargraves Law Tracts.
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This rule of crown ownership of the seashore is innocuous enough,
if taken to mean that title was in the king in those cases where no
grant had been made of the adjacent upland, but that where such
grant had been made the shore, as appurtenant, was included in the
title.20 Such, howeveri is not the interpretation subsequently adopted
by the courts.
With reference to the public rights over navigable waters Lord
Hale writes :-
* * * There may be such an interest lodged in a subject, not
only in navigable rivers, but even in the ports of the sea itself,
contiguous to the shore, though below the low-water mark,
whereby a subject may not only have a liberty but also a right or
propriety of soil. But yet this, that I have said, must be taken
with this allay, which I have in part premised.
"ist. That this interest or right in a subject must besoused
as it may not occasion a common annoyance to passage of ships
or boats ;-for the jus privatum, that is acquired to the subject
either by patent or prescription, must not prejudice the jus publi-
cum, wherewith public rivers or arms of the sea are affected for
public use. * * *21
"2nd. That the people have a public interest, ajuspublicum,
of passage and repassage, with their goods by water, and must
not be obstructed by nuisances, or impeached by actions, as shall
be shown when we come to consider of ports. For the jus priva-
tum of the owner or proprietor is charged with and subject to
the jus publicum which belongs to the king's subjects; as the
soil of an highway is, which though in point of property it may
be a private man's freehold, yet is charged with a publick
interest of the people, which may not be so prejudiced or dam-
nified."22
It will be noted from a close reading of the foregoing that this
great jurist in defining the jus publicum limits it to navigation over
the waters, and in stating that the Jus privatum or title to the soil is
subject to the Jus publicum or right of navigation, he specifically
refers to "a right or propriety of soil though below the low-water nark"
and not the tideway itself.23 The only other public right in the
navigable waters mentioned by Hale is that of a "publick common of
piscary", which, however, he states may be the subject of an ex-
clusive private grant.24
20Hale might have so intended, as in the original manuscript of his first treatise
(Hargrave No. 98) he conceded the ownership of the foreshore by the adjacent
manor upon the authority of Sir Henry Constable's Case (supra, n. ii) and states
that the shore is "most ordinaryly parcell of the adjoyning land" and only prima
facia in the king. In chapter V, however, of the treatise as published, he refers
to the necessity of an express grant of the foreshore.
2Hale, supra, ch. v.2 Idem, ch. vi.2 Riggs, supra, n. i$, at p. 403.24Lord Fitzwalter's Case, i Mod. (Eng.) io6 (1673); Hale, supra, ch. iv.
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With the passing of the Stuart kings and the divine right theory,
litigation over the foreshore between individual owners and the
crown gradually disappeared, and it is not until after the American
Revolution that we find English cases definitely declaring in favor of
the prima facie theory of crown ownership and developing in appo-
sition the theories of the jus privatum and jus publicum.28 At the
time, however, of the American Revolution,27 the common law of
England (always excepting the unreported Philpot case) was that
the title of the adjacent upland owner carried to low water mark, as
first stated by Baron Walter even in the Philpot case.28 Furthermore,
as stated in the case of Bell v. Gough:29
"There is no evidence that the jus privatum, the right of
private property in the shore to low water mark was ever asserted
in the colony as a right of the crown, or that it has until re-
cently been claimed by the state, but there is on the contrary,
in my opinion, the strongest evidence that this right has been
abandoned to the proprietors of the adjoining land from the
first settlement of the Province and exercised by them to the
present day so as to become a common right and thus the com-
mon law."
It follows that the courts of this state, in approaching the ques-
tion, could and probably should have adopted 0 this rule of upland
ownership instead of following, as they did,3' the theory of crown
ownership, ambiguously stated by Hale, and developed by the
English cases subsequent to the Revolution. To have done so,
however, would have required much patient research, or the results
of the same, which were not at the time available,"2 whereas the
theory that the king and therefore the State of New York, as his
successor, was the owner of the land between high and low water
mark, unless the same had been expressly conveyed, was ready to
hand and had gained currency.3 This rule of title having been
2Lord Advocate v. Blantyre, 4 A. C. (Eng.) 770, 773 (1879).26Moore, supra, n. 4, P. 432-3. Att'y.-Gen. v. Richards, 2 Anst. (Eng.) 603('795); Pay-meter v. Att'y.-Gen., io Price (Eng.) 412 (1813).27April 19, 1775.28Att'y.-Gen. v. Turner, 2 Mod. (Eng.) io6 (1793), 2 Lilly's Practical Register,
tit. Rights; Moore, supra, n. I3; Coudert, Riparian Rights: A Perversion of Stare
Decisis, 9 Col. L. Rev. 223; Parson's Public and Private Rights in theForeshore,
22 Col. L. Rev. 711.
2923 N. J. L. 624, 661 (1852), quoted in Gould on Waters, p. 75, and referred to
in the Brookhaven and Barnes cases, infra, n. 34, 46.
30Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 15 Wend. i I 1 (1835); Watersv. Gerard, 189 N. Y.
302 (1907); New York State Constitution of April 20, 1777, sec. 35.2 Canal Comm. and Appraisers v. People ex rel. Tibbets, 5 Wend. (N. Y.)
423 (183o).32Moore's History of the Foreshore was not published until 1888.23Hale, supra; 2 Blackstone's Commentaries 261; Kent's Commentaries; and
English cases decided subsequent to 1775, supra, n. 26. Chancellor Walworth in
deciding People ex rel. Tibbets in I83O, supra, n. 31, at p. 443, said: "In England
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adopted it became necessary to determine exactly what portions of
the shore lands had been granted by the king in colonial times.
TITLE TO THE BEACHES. THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION
OF THE COLONIAL CROWN GRANTS
The primary inquiry involved the validity of the grants of the
colonial governors, representing the king, both to individuals and to
groups of freeholders establishing a town. It was early decided that
these conveyances having been confirmed by the New York colonial
assembly and validated by the constitution of the state were binding,
and it is under such grants that title to property is derived, and they
constitute the bedrock of our system of land titles.3 The next
question involved an interpretation of these grants where the de-
scription designated as a boundary the ocean or sound, and it was
decided in harmony with the prima facie rule, that the beach was
not included in the upland title unless it expressly ran to low water
mark, or, by some distinctive phrase, included the beach as an
appurtenance. 5 Otherwise the title ran to high water mark only,"'
and the foreshore being unconveyed and left in the crown, the state
succeeded to the title. 7 The result of such decisions has been to give
to the state practically all the beach land below high water mark
along the Atlantic ocean and Long Island Sound shore fronts, al-
though the adjacent upland is owned by towns or individuals.
The next question arose as to the title to the bodies of water and
their beaches, consisting of the bays, creeks, inlets, and other es-
tuaries of the sea and sound. If such waters were to be regarded as
integral parts of the sound or ocean, under the rule that the grant
ran only to high water mark, it would follow that the state also
owned the beaches of these various interior bays and inlets where the
tide rose and fell. The case of Lowndes v. Huntington 8 decided this
question by declaring that where the words "sound" or "ocean" were
no principle of the common law as to the rights of property is better established,"
citing Hale and Kent. "The fountain from which all the rules on the subject
now under consideration have been drawn, is the celebrated treatise de jure mais
by Lord Chief Justice Hale." People v. CanalAppraisers, 33 N. Y. 46, 468 (1865).
34People v. Clark, IO Barb. 20 (185o); Brookhaven v. Strong, 6o N.Y. 56(1825); Town of Southhampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co., iI6 N.Y. (i889);Laws
of the Colony of N. Y., 1694, vol. i, p. 224; Constitution of N. Y., Art r, sec. 17.3 Rockaway Beach Co. v. City of N. Y., 14o App. Div. 16o (i9io), upholding
Dongan patent of beach to Capt. John Palmer, the description reading "on the
south with the Maine sea to low water mark."
36Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 5x8 (1826); Mayor v. Hart, 95 N. Y. 443
(1884); Matter of City of N. Y. (West Farms Rd.), 212 N. Y. 325 (I914).
3rPeople v. Trinity Church, 22 N. Y. 44 (i86O); Wendell v. People, 8 Wend.
183 (I831); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Schultz, II6 N. Y. 382., (1889).
38153 U. S. I (1894).
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used as indicating the boundaries of the grant they referred to the
main or outlying body of water and that their estuaries, such as bays,
harbors, and inlets, were within such boundaries and passed with
the grants, and the state had no title therein. This decision har-"
monizes with similar New York cases involving crown grants to
the various Long Island townships. 9
To summarize with reference to the title documents it is estab-
lished (a) that the crown grants involving the beaches are valid,
(b) that the state owns the beaches along the sound or ocean front
unless the colonial grant ran to low water mark or the beach is ex-
pressly designated, and (c) that, where the grant is bounded by the
sea or sound, title to the connecting harbors and bays with their
beaches is in the grantees or their successors and not the state.
THE RiPAUAN RiGHTS OF THE UPLAND Ow R. A QUASi RE-ASSER-
TION OF THE ANCIENT LAW OF THE MANOR
If, under the prima facie theory, the king privately owned all un-
conveyed tidal lands and the state succeeded to his title, it followed
that the adjacent upland owner had no property rights in the fore-
shore. Such substantially became the law of England" and the rule
early adopted in this state.4 This worked an injustice to the upland
owner, who was obviously the person who could best use the beach in
front of his property, which may have been the reason for the original
doctrine regarding the beach as an appurtenance of the upland.
The courts of this state, recognizing the hardship of thus restricting
the upland owner, gradually accorded him property rights in the
foreshore,42 even to the erection of structures, such as a pier,4 ' even
though the latter might interfere with the use of the beach by the
holder of the title; and the latter was restrained from erecting struc-
tures which would interfere with the rights of the upland owner."
Profoundly considered, these adjudications establishing substantial
property rights of the upland owner in and to the beach reconstitute
39Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 2o9 N. Y. I (1913); Grace v. Town of North
Hempstead, 166 App. Div. 844 (I915), aff'd. 22o N. Y. 628; Starke-Belknap v.
N.Y. C. R. R. Co., 197App. Div. 249 (1921), aff'd. 234 N. Y. 630; Bliss v. Bene-
dict, 202 App. Div. 115 (1922), aff'd. 234 N. Y. 596.
40This was the judgment in the Philpot case, followed in Att'y-Gen. v. Richards
(1795) and Parmeter v. Gibbs (1813) supra, n. 26. However, Buccleuch v.
Metrop. Board of Works, L. R. 5 H. L. 418 (1872) finally modified this rule in
favor of the upland owner.
"Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 (1828); Gould v. Hudson R.iv. R. R. Co., 6 N. Y.
522 (1852).42Rumsey v. N. Y. &. N. R. R. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 79 (1892); Matter of Cityof
N. Y., 168 N. Y. 134 (19Ol).
"Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74 (1907).
"Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N. Y. 15 (1922).
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to this extent his ancient status as its true owner, and, in effect,
distinctly modify the prima facie rule of title. Indeed the dissenting
opinion of HiscocR, J., in the Brookhaven case, adhering as it does to
the rule of the king's personal ownership of the shore, is entirely
logical. The court might unanimously have achieved the same
result by disregarding the Philpot case and the prima facie theory,
and, by reviving the law treating the beach as appurtenant to the
upland,45 thus have avoided the inconsistencies which the dissenting
opinion so clearly indicates. As it is, the court in upholding the
claim of the upland owner to a practical use of the adjacent beach
denied pro tanto the rights of the title owner; it stopped short, how-
ever, of a rejection of the theory of the king's title, achieving its ends
by subjecting the title to a broad easement. The case of Barnes v.
Midland R. R. Terminal Co.46 closely followed, reaffirming the ease-
ment of the riparian owner, but holding that it should be so exercised
as not to interfere with a public right of passage. If, as has been con-
tended,47 the court in the Brookhaven and Barnes decisions aban-
450n ground that such was the common law of England in 1775, and in any
event that of the former colony of N. Y. see n. 33, infra.
46193 N. Y. 378 (igo8).
47Coudert, supra, n. 28, at p. 231. In Bardes v. Herman, 62 Misc. (N. Y. 428,
43x-2 (1gog), Blackmar, J., takes exactly this view, stating: "The Barnes case
decided that the common law of England as to the ownership by the sovereign of
the jus privatum never obtained in the province which became the State of New
York; but that the jus privatum, which I understand to be the complete title, sub-
ject to the rights of the public, was abandoned to the owners of the upland. ***
It is claimed that the rule that the jus privatum is owned by the adjacent
proprietors is inconsistent with the continued grants of land under water by the
State. But these grants were eo nomine made for the benefit of commerce and they
could be made only to the owners of the adjacent land, thereby recognizing by
this right of pre-emption the interest of the owners in the foreshore and land under
water. The Norwood patent * * * was bounded to the east by the 'waterside.' If
I am right as to the rulellaid down in the Bares case, the ius privatum in the fore-
shore was vested in Norwood even if the word 'waterside' meant high water
mark." However, in Oelsner v. Nassau Light and Power Company, 134 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 281, 285 (19o9), Miller, J., in a characteristically incisive analysis
of the Brookhaven and Barnes cases, with comment on the view just quoted,
says in part:
"The decisions in Town of Brookhaven v. Smith *** and Barnes v. Midland
R. R. Terminal Co. * * * have been construed by an able and careful judge as
holding that the complete title, subject to the rights of the public, is in the owner
of the uplands. (See Bardes v. Herman, 62 Misc. Rep. 428.) I do not think that
the Court of Appeals intended to announce any such doctrine. * * * The Town of
Brookhaven case decided that the common law of England was inapplicable to our
changed conditions in so far as it did not allow the riparian owner to make prac-
tical use of his right of access by the construction of a wharf or pier. The Barnes
case decided that that right must be exercised in a reasonable way so as not to
interfere with the right of passage of the public.
"* * * It can hardly be said to be the recognized common law of this State
that the proprietary rights of the king have been abandoned to, and are now owned
by, the owners of the upland inview of the factthat theright oftheStatetomake
grants of lands under water has been exercised throughout its history and has
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doned the prima facie rule and the jus privatum of the king, the fore-
shore would have been re-established as an appurtenance of the up-
land title with the result that upland proprietors generally would
have not merely an easement in but title itself to the beach in front of
their property and the state would have no property rights therein,
having succeeded to none. While the language of Gray, J., in the
Brookhaven case s undoubtedly warrants this view, the decision itself
grants an easement only, and subsequent cases of the courtuphold the
state's title to the foreshore as against the riparian owner.4 9
From the history of the foreshore, thus briefly reviewed, it may be
summarized: (a) that until the reign of Charles I, under the common
law, the adjacent owner held title to the beach as an appurtenance
of the upland; (b) that the attempt to overthrow this doctrine cul-
minating in the Philpot case and the conclusions of Lord Hale, re-
sulted ultimately in the adoption of the rule that the king or state
owned the tideway unless specifically granted; (c) that recently the
ancient rule of title has been partially reinstated by the establish-
ment of a broad easement of use in the foreshore in favor of the up-
land owner.
WHAT ARE THE PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE SEASHORE? CAN THE
STATE EXTINGUISH THEM?
It having been established that the upland owner has substantial
property rights in the foreshore, irrespective of who holds the title,
we now approach the question of what are the public rights in the
seashore. While the authorities are clear that access to and use of the
beach by the riparian owner cannot be unreasonably obstructed by
any other use thereof,50 is the public entitled to pass along, bathe,
picnic, anchor boats, dig shell fish, andgenerally use the beach, assum-
ing such does not constitute an unreasonable interference? In order
to obtain the proper perspective on this question it has been desirable,
indeed necessary, to review the history of the foreshore, for if there are
never been questioned. These grants convey, not the right of dominion for pur-
poss f nviatonbu th tl, te roriearrigtsofthekig,**they are im-
pliely adesubect o te p ror rghtwhih ws alayshel intrust for thepublic, the right of dominion in aid of navigation. ""
"It is plainly deducible from the .Barnes case that the riparianowner and the
owner of the title must exercise their respective rights in a reasonable way con-
sistent with the rights of each other. Both are subject to the supreme right ofthe State and the national government to exercise dominion for the purpose of
navigation."
48Supra, n. 43, at pp. 79-80.49 Hinkley v. State of New York, 234 N. Y. 4o9 (1922), holding the state owned
the tideway as against the upland proprietor and despite a seventy-five year
user.5 0Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y. 61 (1897), holds that the riparian owner's rights are
subject to the right of the state to improve the foreshore in aid of navigaton.
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public rights of property in the foreshore they have their roots in the
past.
The claim is made, and there is high judicial opinion supporting it,
that the public have property rights in a tidal beach.5 ' What is the
essential nature of this claim? Apparently it is not based upon the
element of a fee title, for members of the unorganized public appar-
ently have no greater rights in the foreshore, which is owned by the
state (except by license or permission) than they would have if the
title was in an individual-or a town. The law of the state authorizes
the institution of actions for damages against members of the public,
though citizens of the state, for trespassing upon any of the public
lands including lands under water.5 2 If, therefore, the unorganized
public is entitled to the use of the foreshore, state owned or otherwise,
it must be because of some peaceable and uninterrupted usage exist-
ing from time immemorial, constituting, in effect, an unwritten cove-
nant running with the land to which the title, no matter how held, is
subservient. Such a right would be similar to, if not a true, easement;
a rule of property peculiar to the foreshore in favor of the people at
large. Excepting specific instances of purely local custom or pre-
scription, such a tradition of public use applying to the foreshore
generally is scarcely to be discovered in either the economic or legal
history of New York tideways, and if, therefore, they are to be sub-
jected to a public easement, the latter must depend for its authority
upon the law of England at the time of the American Revolution
from whence we inherited it, or, if not the law of England, the law
as it obtained in the colonial province of New York." What, then,
5 Barnes v. Midland T. R. R. Co., 193 N. Y. 378 (19o8); Bardes v. Herman
62 Misc. (N. Y.) 428 (19o9); Aquino v. Riegelman, 104 Misc. (N. Y.) 228 (1918)
Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay, 234 N. Y. 15 (1922).
52Public Lands Law, sec. 17.
53Such would seem to be the more valid test. Under the colonial grants it was
stipulated that the laws of the colony of New York should follow "as near as
conveniently may be" the laws of England. (Fowler's Real Property Law [3d
ed.], p. 67). The New York constitution of April 20, 1777, section 35, adopted the
statutes and common law of theformer colony of New York as they existed April i,
1775. The courts of this state are not necessarily bound by the common law of
England if the latter was not in harmony with that of the colony or is not adapt-
able to our conditions. (Brookhaven v. Smith, supra, n. 43, P. 78.) While the
decisions of the colonial courts of New York are unreported and there are no
early New York State cases containing any discussion of public rights in the
beach itself, extrinsic evidence indicates that the claim of a public easement in
the seashore is of distinctly modem origin. In Bell v. Gough (supra, n. 29) the
court pointed out that in the adjacent colony of New Jersey the foreshore was
considered as belonging to the upland owner. The Massachusetts colonial
"Body of Liberties", the first code of laws established in New England (164r),
Article 16, provided that every inhabitant who was a householder should have
the right of "free fishing and fowling so farre as the sea ebbs and flowes within the
precints of the town where they dwell" unless these rights had been otherwise
appropriated by the town, and further provided "that this shall not be extended
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in 1775, was the common law with reference to a general public ease-
ment in and to the foreshore?
As heretofore stated, at the time of the Revolution, the theory
that the king, prima fade, owned the foreshore had not been estab-
lished in England, the law at that time being the immemorial rule
that the upland owner held the title; as for public rights there are
no cases adjudicating or even discussing them. The long series of
litigations concerning the seashore, starting with Digges in the time of
Elizabeth and continuing through the reign of the Stuart kings, do
not involve public claims. They were cases of the king asserting a
personal claim of ownership against the private rights of the upland
proprietor. The earliest authentic expression which might be con-,
strued as referring to public rights in the foreshore is that contained
in Lord Hale's treatise. 4 A careful reading of Hale discloses that he
strictly limits the definition of fus publicum to a right of passage over
water and, in a qualified sense, to a public right to fish in the waters.,
He states that the foreshore cannot be so used as to obstruct or
interfere with this right of navigation and that in this respect the fus
publicum is paramount to the fus privatum. The claim, therefore, that
the public have rights to use the foreshore itself when the tide is out
would seem to rest upon the theory that such rights are, by implica-
tion, a part of the 'us publicum so as to include passage along the
beach for bathing, boating, etc.
to give leave to any man to come upon another's propertie without there leave."
In 1647 this same colony adopted a statute giving the title to the land between
high and low water mark to the upland owner. Such action negatives the sug-
gestion of a public easement in the beach as a rule of law and was in harmony
with the individualistic spirit of colonial times. Economic conditions then pre-
vailing made it quite natural that the beach should be exclusively enjoyed by its
owners. The grants were made at a time when the land was unsettled and the
chief anxiety of ad strators was to procure settlers and inducements were
made to encourage them to develop the property granted. In those days the
chief means of communication was by water and the beach fronting a person's
property was of prime importance to him. Furthermore the seat of government
was far distant, there was no public in the modem sense of a social entity and it
was natural that the pioneeer settlers should assert an exclusive control over their
property. This view is further substantiated when we recall that the dominant
philosophy of the 18th century, permeating legal as well aspoliticalinstitutions,
jealously regarded and aggressively supported individual rights in property as
natural and even "sacred". (Articles 2 and 17, Declaration of Rights of Man,
1789.) "The public good is nothing more essentially interested than in the
protection of every individual's private rights." (Blackstone, I Comm. i39.)
"The doctrine of private property as a natural right has found its way, directly or
indirectly, into almost every bill of rights and state constitution of the nation,
thanks to the prevalent political philosophy of a century or more ago." (Mecklin,
Introduction to Social Ethics, 1921, p. 302-321.) According to Dean Pound (The
Spirit of the Common Law, p. 37) an ultra individualism pervaded New England
institutions due to Puritanism. Apparently the "mores" of the times did not
favor a public servitude upon privately owned foreshore.
mSupra, n. 21, published 1787.
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The first English cases in which questions of public rights in the
foreshore arise are well after the American Revolution and in the
early part of the nineteenth century. Such cases are significantly
coincident with the administrative development of democratic gov-
ernment, the emphasis in 'shore front litigation shifting from the
the law, subsequent English cases not purporting to modify the com-
mon law "are not only entitled to careful consideration but to great
weight in determining the common law rule prior to I775."55 The
earliest of these cases, decided in i789, 66 apparently extends the jus
publicum of navigation to passage along the beach but appears to
have been subsequently overruled,57 while a comparatively recent
case holds that "when the sea recedes and the foreshore becomes dry
there is not * * * any general common law right in the public to pass
over the foreshore."' ss
Turning to the courts of this state, while there are expressions to
the effect that the public have general rights in the foreshore there
does not appear to be any decision squarely holding upon a relevant
state of facts that a tide-washed beach, especially where owned in
absolute fee by an individual or a town, is subject to any public
easement whatever, not even that of passage. On the contrary, the
decisions, meager though they be, indicate that that portion of the
soil between high and low water mark is governed by identical prin-
ciples of real property law as govern the upland, that is to say, the
title connotes an exclusive use of the beach, subject, however, to the
easement of the upland owner.
There are two classes of adjudications leading to this conclusion.
There are those cases where the state, under the prima facie rule,
succeeding to the title of the king, made absolute grants of the fore-
shore, and it was held that the grantee thereunder was entitled to an
exclusive use of the beach. These cases are not, however, necessarily
authority that no public easement existed prior to the grant, as they
might be construed as holding that the state, as the people's agent,
by giving the grant, extinguished the easement. The context of the
opinions fairly indicates, however, thattheonlypubliceasementwhich
exists is that of passage over the navigable waters. There is the more
pertinent situation where the title passed by the colonial grants and is
now owned by the towns or individuals; in such situations a public
55Waters v. Gerard, 189 N. Y. at p. 302 (1907).
56Ball v. Herbert, 3 D. & E. (Eng.) 253 (1789).
57Blundell v. Catterall, 5 Barn. & Ald. (Eng.) 268 (1821).5 8Brinckmanv. Matley, 12 Ch. Div. 313,316 (904); also Fitzhardinge (Lord) v.
Purcell, 99 L.T. Rep. 154 (1908), 2 Ch. Div. 139; Blandudno Urban District Council
v. Woods, 81 L.T. Rep. 170 (r899), 2 Ch. Div. 705; the latter caseholding thatthe
public could not hold meetings on the beach, even though of a religious nature.
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easement if it previously existed at common law against the king's
private title, would still exist, for the state never having held the
title and having made no grants has released nothing.59 The opinions
in these latter cases constitute, therefore, more decisive authority as
to whether as a rule of property the foreshore is burdened with a
public use.
First as to the cases where there have been state grants. The
contention that the state cannot alienate its title to the seashore so as
to exclude the public therefrom is based upon the theory that the
state holds the foreshore not as a proprietary owner, but in a political
capacity in trust for the people and as trustee cannot divest itself of
the title.60 This theory in turn goes back to the idea that while the
king could convey his private title to the lands under water (the jus
privatum), that he could not convey or cancel by conveyance the
public right over the navigable waters (the jus publicum) which, as
sovereign, he held in trust.8' The whole contention is, undoubtedly,
based upon Lord Hale's treatise defining in conjunction the jus
publicum and the jus privatum and borrows color from the close asso-
ciation of the foreshore and the navigable waters in English history,
both having been subject to the attack of the Stuart kings.
If, however, we sharply differentiate rights in the shore when the
tide is out from rights of navigation,62 the weight of authority in this
state holds that an unqualified grant from the state extinguishes
any public rights, for the legislature, representing the people, has
authorized such grants and has provided the machinery through the
commissioners of the Land office whereby they can be made, abso-
lute in terms and for beneficial enjoyment.6 Moreover, the statute
59Although it might be contended that the ratification of crown grants by the
New York colonial assembly in 1694, supra, n. 34, extinguished any public ease-
ment.60Coxe v. State, 144 N. Y. 396, 405-4o6 (1895).
elPeople v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 71, 76-77 (1877).
6As to the power of the state to extinguish the jus publizum of navigation by
granting the navigable waters themselves, quaere. The early cases apparentlyup-
hold such grants. Wetmore v. Atlantic Lead Co., 37 Barb. (N. Y., I7 (1862);
People v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., supra; Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129, 155-156
(883); Kerr v. West Shore R. R. Co., 127 N. Y. 269 (I89i). Also see Riggs, The
Alienability of the State's Title to the Foreshore, 12 Col. L. Rev. 409. Later
cases, however, indicate a contrary and probably sounder view. Cox. v. State,
144 N. Y. 396 (1895); Sage v. Mayor, I5 4 N. Y. 61 (1897); Matter of Long Sault
Development Co., 212 N. Y. I (1912); Appleby v. City of N. Y., 235 N. Y. 351
(1923); People ex rel. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. State Tax Commission, Ct. Appeals,
Dec. 9, 1924. As to whether the ilis publicum or control over navigation is in
the state or federal government, see Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 271
(1897); People v. Hudson River Connecting R. R., 228 N. Y. 203, 218-220 (1920).63Public Lands Law, sec. 75. Prior to 1850 the law authorized grants by the
state in aid of commerce; since 185o the law in addition authorizes grants to ad-
jacent upland owners "for beneficial enjoyment".
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provides that such grants can only be made to the "proprietor of the
adjacent land" which apparently is another recognition of his an-
cient status as owner of the beach in front of his property. In making
such a grant the state, of course, may expressly reserve a public
right of passage or make a conditional grant in the nature of a fran-
chise for the purpose of improving the water front, which may be
cancelled if the grantee fails to comply with the conditions." Other-
wise it is difficult to see why the state's power to alienate the fore-
shore should be regarded differently than with reference to the other
public lands as to which the people's representatives have author-
ized conveyances, and which are not prohibited by any constitutional
provision.
Rogers v. Jones65 is one of the earliest cases holding that public
rights can be extinguished by a grant. Here the lands under water
were owned by the town of Oyster Bay by virtue of a colonial crown
grant. Rogers, apparently an inhabitant of the town, took oysters
from the town's land and was sued for a penalty imposed for such a
taking. Rogers defended on the ground that the jus publicum ac-
corded a public right of fishery which the town could not interfere
with. The court held that the grant by the king to the town, ex-
pressly including the fishery rights, cut off any public right thereto.
This case is particularly significant, for while it does not involve
rights in the foreshore itself, it goes further and holds that the right of
fishery in navigable waters, which Hale specifically mentions as
being part of the fus publicum, could be extinguished by a grant from
the king.
In Nolan v. Rockaway Park Improvement Co.,"6 the court excluded
the public from the use of the beach on the ground that the grant
from the state had cut off whatever public rights may have existed.
The leading modem case is that of People v. Steeplechase Park Co. 67
The state grant was to an individual, for beneficial enjoyment, of
part of the seashore along Coney Island, a beach greatly frequented
by the public for recreational purposes. Prior to the conveyance, the
public had passed over this portion of the beach and the new owner,
by erecting piers, prevented such passage. The court held where the
state has conveyed land without restriction intending to grant a fee
therein for beneficial enjoyment, the title of the grantee except as
"Williams v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 419 (1887); Trustees of Southampton v. Jessup,
162 N. Y. 122 (I9OO); American Ice Co. v. City of N. Y., 217 N. Y. 402 (1916);
First Construction Co. v. State of N. Y., 221 N. Y. 295 (1917).
6I Wend (N. Y.) 237 (1828). To same effect, Brookhaven v. Strong, supra, n.
34; Robins v. Ackerly, 91 N. Y. 98 (1883); Hand v. Newton, 92 N. Y. 88 (1893).
6676 Hun. (N. Y.) 458 (i89.5).
67218 N. Y. 459 (i916).
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against the riparian owner is absolute, and the public may be ex-
cluded. This decision was dissented from by three of the judges on
the ground that there should be read into the grant an implied reser-
vation of public rights.68
In a recent case (1923)69 the court again discusses the effect of a
grant on the extinguishment of public rights. The opinion states in
part:
"* * *to what extent has the state by its grants extinguished
the jus publicum over such lands. * * * so long as they remained
under water they were subject to the sovereign power of the state
to regulate their use for purposes of navigation. * * * But no case
holds that any substantial interference with navigation may thus
be authorized. * * * The lands in question remained under the
public waters of the State and so long as they remained such,
the right to control navigation over them remained in the State to
be exercised in the public interest."70
This view seems to indicate that the court does not consider there is
a public easement of access to and of use in the beach itself, for the
only public right it exempts from the operation of the grant by the
state, is that of passage over the navigable waters.
Turning to cases where there is no question involved of the state
having by grant extinguished public rights, in the case of Murphy v.
City of Brooklyn,7 0° decided in 1885, the plaintiff, in a tort action,
claimed that the city had been negligent for causing and permitting
a hole to remain on the upland immediately adjacent to the beach
owned by the city on the theory that the beach was a public highway.
The court stated: "But the seashore is not a highway for public
travel on foot or with vehicles. It is a part of the ocean and that is
a highway for vessels. Everyone can, however, unless the public
authorities by lawful action interfere, go upon the seashore between
high and low water mark to fish, to bathe or for any other lawful
purpose." While the court stated that the public could use a tideway
which was owned by the municipality, nevertheless such a usage was
68A crown grant contained an implied reservation of public rights of navigation.
People v. N. Y. & S. I. Perry Co. (1877), supra, n. 6I, at p. 76. In the Steeple-
chase case the claim was of access over the beach at low tide. In Aquino v. Rie-
gelman (19I8), supra, n. 5I, the court at trial term refused at the risk of being
deemed "recalcitrant" to follow the authority of the Steeplechase case, and re-
quired an express habendum clause in the state grant of the beach to extinguish
public rights; but here also the claim at bar was not one of navigation but.of
access to the beach itself.
69Appleby v. City of NewYork, supra, n. 62. To same effect, Matter of Public
Service Commission (Montague Street), 224 N. Y. 211 (I918); Matter of Long
Sault Devel. Co., supra, n. 62; People ex rel. N. Y. 0. & W. R. R. Co. v. State
Tax Comm., 191 N. Y. S. 464 (1921).
"
0At pp. 360, 362; italics are writer's.
7Oa98 N. Y. 643.
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*by way of permission which could be stopped byg overnmental agents,
and there were no property rights such as an easement of passage or
otherwise in favor of the public even though the shore was publically
owned.
In the Matter of the City of New York (Main Street), decided in
1915, the court held that where a public street orhighway met with
navigable waters at high tide that this fact gave an extended easement
of public passage across the foreshore in order to reach the water when
the tide was out even through the title to that portion of the foreshore
was held by an individual derived from a crown patent. But the
court stated:
"The title of the appellant vested in her the right * ** to use
the parcel of land under waters for any and all purposes which
did not bar the public from reaching the waters of the sound
from the terminus of Main street or the street from the waters
of the sound, and the further right to so use them free from such
restriction whenever, if ever, the street should be abandoned or discon-
tinued. The right was private property protected by the relevant
constitutional provisions."7 2
The idea clearly expressed in the foregoing quotation that shore
lands owned by an individual under a crown patent are private
property not subject to any general public easement (the case at bar
involved a specific and purely local situation where an upland public
highway connected with navigable waters) is echoed in the early
case of Wetmore v. Atlantic Lead Co.,73 where the court stated in part
as follows, referring to the filling in of shore land by the upland owner
under a state grant:
"When reclaimed and covered with artificial structures, they
became a part of the bank of the river, and were no longer subject
to the public easement which affected the channel. As far as such
artificial accretions are made to public highways upon the bank
or shore, they become a part of such highways, but when added
to a portion of the bank over which no such right of passage
existed, they are a gain to the adjoining proprietor, and do not
bring with them a right of use or passage over the land, in conse-
quence of the right of navigation which had existed over the waters
which had been displaced by such additions to the land."7'
In Smith v. Odell, 5 decided in 1922, the town of Brookhaven held
title to lands under water in Great South Bay. The town leased to
the defendant, a private individual, certain of this land for hunting
72r6 N. Y. 67 (1915).
72At p. 77; italics are writer's.
7237 Barb. 70 (1862).
74At p. 97; italics are writer's.
75234 N. Y. 267 (1915).
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purposes. The residents of the town were thus hindered in their en-
joyment of duck-hunting on the bay and marsh lands and brought an
action to cancel the lease. The court held that as the town owned
the waters and the lands thereunder it was entirely within its rights
to lease the same to an individual to the exclusion of its inhabitants
and the general public so long as such leasing did not interfere with
the public right of navigation over the waters. The court stated:
"The trustees and their predecessors [are] invested with the
fee of the lands * * *
"The title of the trustees and the rights conferred by the
patents are subject, however, in the interest of commerce, to the
right of the public to use the waters of the bay for the purpose of
navigation.
"The public right, whatever it might otherwise be, must be
held limited in such a situation to the right to use the waters for
the purposes of a public highway. * * * the easement of passage
over navigable waters does not involve the surrender of other priv-
ileges which are capable of enjoyment without interference to the
navigator."71
While this case does not specifically involve the foreshore the in-
ference is clear that the town could, with equal propriety, have
leased its shore lands to a private interest to the exclusion of its resi-
dents, as the only general public easement protected by the law is that
of navigation over the waters, which easement does not include other
uses.
In harmony with this decision, are several other adjudications with
reference to the beach titles of Long Island towns acquired under the
colonial grants; these cases consistently hold that the town's title is a
private or proprietary one and that such shorelands are not subject
to any public rights, the town having power to sell or lease exclusive
privileges therein.7 7 In the Town of Islip v. Estates of Havemeyer
Point"' involving a piece of beach land, the court stated:
76At pp. 271, 272; italics are writer's.71Roe v. Strong, 107 N. Y. 350 (1887); Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay
Oyster Co., ii6 N. Y. (1889); Brookhaven v. Smith supra, n. .4; Town of Islip
v. Estates of Havemeyer, 224 N. Y. 449 (1918). Apparently the trustees of towns
owning title to beaches on Long Island, may, subject to the control of the in-
habitants expressed at town meetings, make such rules and regulations concerning
the use of their beaches as they deem proper, excluding the general public en-
tirely, charging admission fees, selling, leasing, or otherwise alienating the beach
as in the case of an individual owner. The towns' rights in their beaches are sub-ject only to the rights of the riparian owner and the public right of navigation
over the waters. Apparently, however, in the case of the City of New York,
which acquired title to the lands to low water mark along the Hudson and East
Rivers by the colonial patents of Governor Dongon, in 1686, and Montgomerie, in
1730, such foreshore is impressed with a public trust as the terms of the grant
reserved the right to control and regulate its use in the crown and the colonial
government. 182 N. Y. 361, 368 (19o5); Parsons, supra, n. 28, at p. 722-23.
In the Tiffany case (supra, n. 51, p. 21) Pound, J., referred to the case of Matter
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"These lands were held by the town in private as distinguished
from public ownership. It needed no legislative authority to
enable it to deal with them as its interests might require. It
could devote them to the use of the inhabitants in common. It
could convey or lease them."
The case of Barnes v. Midland Railroad Terminal Company,7 8
decided in i9o8, is often cited as authority for the doctrine that the
people have the right of passage, bathing, etc., in the foreshore, and
the opinion specifically so states. The facts in this case show that
the plaintiff was seeking to restrain the upland owner from obstruc-
ting, by the erection of a pier, thepassage of thepublic along the beach.
Title to the foreshore in this case had been in the State of New York
from whom the defendant company had received a conditional
grant permitting it to erect a pier over the beach providing, how-
ever, that it should not "in any manner, obstruct, interfere with, in-
convenience or prevent any person or persons from or in crossing and
re-crossing in any manner or way said land between high and low
watermark * * *." Therefore, while the opinion contains expressions to
the effect that there are public rights of fishing, bathing, and boating
in the foreshore what the court actually decided in this case was
that, while the plaintiff had a right to erect a pier, he could not
erect it so as to obstruct the public passage, that right being reserved
in the grant from the state.
The recent case of- Tiffany v. Town of Oyster Bay7 9 decided that the
town, although it owned the foreshore which had been filled in by the
plaintiff, could not use such filled in foreshore for the erection of bath-
houses, as such use would interfere with Tiffany's right of access to
the water as a riparian owner. In the opinion, however, there are ex-
pressions of a general nature which while not necessary to the de-
cision in the case, indicate a public easement in the foreshore general-
ly. Pound, J., says:
"Land under the waters of the sea and its arms, between high
and low-water mark, is subject, first, to the jus publicum-the
right of navigation, and when the tide is out, the right of access
to the water for fishing, bathing and other lawful purposes to
which the right of passage over the beach may be a necessary
incident. (Barnes v. Midland R. R. T. Co., r93 New York 378,
of Mayor, etc., as holding that a municipal ownership of the foreshore is "for the
use of the public as well as for commerce", whatever that may imply. It is fairly
obvious, however, that what the court was discussing in the latter case was the
development of commerce in conjunction with public rights of navigation and the
waterfront, which view is substantiated by the opinion in Matter of Mayor
Bedlow v. N. Y. FloatingDry Dock Co., 112 N. Y. 263, 273 (1889).
77a224 N. Y. 449, 452 (1918).
78193 N. Y. 378 (19o8).
79234 N. Y. 15, 20 (1922).
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384). Such land is also subject, secondly, to the jus privatum,
the rights of the owner of the foreshore** * Such rights are
at all times subject to the public rights** *."
While it is not entirely clear from the context what the court
meant by jus publicum it apparently included therein both the right
of navigation and a public right of passage over the beach with inci-
dents of fishing, boating, etc., making such rights paramount to the
rights of the owner. Such a definition of the jus publicum is neither
historically correct, nor is it supported, except by dicta, by the actual
decision in the Barnes case cited, preserving a public right of passage
reserved in the state grant. These expressions of opinion in the
Barnes and Tiffany cases80 are contrary to the opinions of the same
court in Matter of City of New York (Main St.),8 ' in Smith v.
Odell and similar cases 8 , wherein the court held that lands under
water, title to which was based on a grant from the crown, were sub-
ject only to the public right of navigation. They are also essentially
contrary to the Rockaway Beach Improvement Co." and Steeple-
chase" cases which while holding that grants from the state extin-
guished any public right in the beach, indicate in the opinions that
there existed no property rights in the shore itself equivalent to a
public easement.
The English cases sustain the view that the jus publicum over
navigable waters does not include public rights in the shore itself.
In Brinckman v. Matley"5 the court held:
80The court in the Barnes case (Werner, J., writing) cited no authority in sup-
port of its opinion that there are public rights in the foreshore, while in the
Tiffany case the court cites only the Barnes case in support of its definition of thej=u publicum. Furthermore, in the Tiffany case it is also stated that if the fore-
shore is filled in it extinguishes the jus publicum. This would indicate that the j=r
publicum consists only of the right of navigation, which naturally is prevented by
the fill excluding the water over the filled-in land at high tide. If, however, thejus publicum also includes rights of passage over the land for fishing, bathing, etc.,
a mere filling in would not make such rights physically unavailable so as to ex-
tinguish them. In Bardes v. Herman, supra, n. 51, at p. 432, the court states as
part of the jar publicum, citing the Barnes case only:-"The public, therefore,had the right to use the foreshore for fishing, bathing, boating and navigation."
But the decision merely involved the question as to whether a vendor offered a
good title to low water mark under a state grant, the court holding that the title
was good, the grant having extinguished any public rights. There is also disagree-
ment in the textbooks. Hall, The Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of the
Subject in the" Seashores of the Realm (Published 183o), at pp. 179-180, states
that the public have an easement of passage, bathing, boating, clamming, etc.,
while Farnuin on Waters, at p. 656, states that there are no public rights in the
shore, that it is not a highway, whether privately or publicly owned.81Supra, n. 71.
82Supra, n. 73, 75, 77, 77a.
8Supra, n. 66.84Supra, n. 67.
Supra, n. 58 at p. 315.
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"By the common law all the King's subjects have in general
a right of passage over the sea with vessels for the purposes of
navigation and have, prima facie, a common of fishery there,
and they have the same rights over that portion of the sea which
lies over the foreshore at the times when the foreshore is covered
with water. But when the sea recedes and the foreshore be-
comes dry there is not, as I understand the law, any general
common law right in the public to pass over the foreshore."
The leading English case of Blundell v. Catterall,6 decided in 1821,
involved the issue as to whether the public had a common law right to
bathe on a private beach. The owner objected to the practice and
sought an injunction. The minority opinion of Best, J., states in
part:S a
"The question in this case is, whether there be a common-
law right to pass over the shore for the purpose of bathing in the
sea. * * * There must be the same right to cross the shore in
order to bathe as for any other lawful purpose. We are, there-
fore, to decide whether the public are precluded from passing * * *
over the beach to the sea without the consent of some lord of
a manor. * * * The king had the right of soil in the shore in
general; but the public had a right of way over it, and the
king's grantee can only have it, subject to the same right.
In the treatise of De Jure Maris, p. 22, Lord Hale says, 'the
]us privatum that is acquired to the subject * * * must not pre-
judice the jus publicum wherewith public rivers and arms of the
sea are affected for public use.' * * *
"The reason on which my judgment is grounded is public
advantage. The right of bathing in the sea, which is essential
to the health of so many persons, is as beneficial to the public as
that of fishing and must have been as well secured to the sub-
jects of this country by the common law.* * *
"* * *From the general nature of this property it could never
be used for exclusive occupancy. It was holden by the king,
like the sea and the highways, for all his subjects. The soil
could only be transferred, subject to this public trust; and
general usage shows that the public right has been excepted out
of the grant of the soil. * * * But unless I felt myself bound by
an authority as straight and clear as an act of Parliament, I would
hold on principles of public policy, I might say public necessity,
that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nui-
sance. * * * In all countries it has been a matter of just com-
plaint, that individuals have encroached on the rights of the
people. In England our ancestdrs put the public rights in rivers
under the safeguard of magna charta. The principle of exclu-
sive appropriation must not be carried beyond things capable ofimprovement by the industry of man. If it be extended so far as
to touch the right of walking over these barren sands, it will
86Supra, n. 57.
86aAt pp. 274, 276, 284, 287-8.
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take from the people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it
will give to individuals only the hateful privilege of vexing their
neighbors. * * * For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the
defendant is entitled to the judgment of the Court."
This view, eloquently spoken as it is, did not prevail but was
countered by the three opinions of equal conviction and even closer
reasoning. These utterances well illustrate contrasting schools of
juristic philosophy. The prevailing opinion of Holyrod, J., which
follows, said to be the finest he ever wrote, "a model of judicial utter-
ance",87 is, in part, as follows:-
"* * *By the common law, all the king's subjects have in
general a right of passage over the sea with their ships, boats, and
other vessels, for the purposes of navigation, commerce, trade,
and intercourse, and also in navigable rivers; and they have also,
prima facie, a common of fishery there. * * * These rights are
noticed by Lord Hale; but whatever further rights, if any, they
may have in the sea, or in navigable rivers, is a very different
question whether they have * * * independently of necessity or
usage, public rights upon the shore * * * when it is not sea, or
covered with water, and especially when it has from time im-
memorial been, or has since become, private property. * * *
Neither in Lord Hale's treatise nor elsewhere, does it appear
that there is a common law right in the king's subjects in gen-
eral, or any of them, to appropriate the sea-shore, or the soil
even below the low water-mark, for general purposes, though
temporary only, to their own use, without the king's grant or
licence, even where that can be done without nuisance to his
subjects.* * *
"But, further, such a general public right in all the king's
subjects, to use the sea shore for all such temporary purposes as
they please, would be, I think, inconsistent with the nature of
permanent private property, or with the sea shore becoming such
permanent private property. * * *
"* * *The public common law rights, too, with respect to the
sea, etc., independently of usage, are rights upon the water, not
upon the land, of passage and fishing on the sea, and on the
sea shore, when covered with water; and though, as incident
thereto, the public must have the means of getting to and upon
the water for these purposes, yet it will appear that it is by
and from such places only as necessity or usage have appropri-
ated to those purposes, and not a general right of lading, unlad-
ing, landing, or embarking where they please upon the sea shore,
or the land adjoining thereto, except in case of peril or neces-
sity."sa
In a concurring opinion upholding the right of plaintiff to enjoin
the trespass, Abbott, C. J., remarks,87b
87L. T. Rev. London, vol. 139, p. 381; also, Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, supra, n. 58.
SaAt pp. 294, 298-9, 301-2.
S'bAt P. 313.
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"One of the topics urged at the bar in favor of this supposed
right was that of public convenience. Public convenience, how-
ever, is in all cases, to be viewed with a due regard to private
property, the protection whereof is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of the law of England."
In the recent case of Stewart v. Turney,8 the court held that the
plaintiff under an unconditional grant from the state could keep the
public from trespassing on his beach. The grant here was of property
on Cayuga lake, a large and navigable body of water, and the proof
showed that the beach was thirty feet wide in the dry season, but at
high water was covered so that small boats could navigate thereover.
The only question was as to title, and the court held that it went to
low water mark and that the trespass should be restrained. The court
did not even mention any public rights in the beach, nor did it ques-
tion the authority of the commissioners of the Land office to make the
unconditional grant in this case, while in the Steeplechase case, three
of the four judges denied the effectiveness of a state grant to cut off
what they apparently considered to be a public easement of access to
a beach at Coney Island. The waters in both cases were navigable in
fact and therefore subject to the public right of navigation; the only
difference being that the beach at Cayuga lake is caused by the rise
and fall of non-tidal water while the beach at Coney Island is made by
the salt tides. This distinction, however, as determinative of the
public right of navigation probably never obtained in England,
and certainly not in American jurisprudence.8 9 There would seem,
therefore, to be no logical reason if a public easement in the beach is
to be upheld, by implication, as part of the ]us publicum of navigation,
why it should not apply to a fresh as well as to a salt water beach.
The idea that the jus publicum includes rights in the beach when
the tide is out doubtless arose from the close association in English
economic and political history of the foreshore and the navigable
waters, reflected in the jus privatum and jus publicum of Lord Hale's
jurisprudence. Prior to Hale's writings the jus privatum of the fore-
shore was unheard of, as the upland owner held the title to the beach,
but when the theory was advanced that the king in his private capa-
city owned the shore and lands under water, it became necessary to
distinguish by phrase between such a private title and the public
title which as sovereign he already held to the sea and navigable
rivers.9" Indeed, it is significant to note that the efforts of Charles I
88237 N. Y. 117 (1923).
89Stegmeier v. State, I9I N. Y. S. 894, 897 (1922), aff'd. 2o4App. Div. 858; Col-
son, Title to Beds of Lakes in New York, 9 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, note at
p. 309.
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to obtain the foreshore were on behalf of himself and not the people,
and that the protest in the Grand Remonstrance against such aggres-
sions was not by the people on behalf of a public use in the beaches
but by their owners, the adjacent upland proprietors. As it happened
the king did not merely interfere with private rights in attempting to
usurp the beaches but also with public rights with reference to the
navigable waters and of fishery therein.
The resultant confusion that has arisen with reference to public
rights in the foreshore has doubtless been largely due to the failure to
distinguish clearly between the public right of navigation over the
waters and a private ownership of the tideway, which, periodically, is
under those waters. From the fact that "the sea and navigable
rivers are a natural highway" 91 it does not follow that there are
analagous rights in the land when the water has receded. "It is a
general principle of law governing every such servitude, (a right of
way) whether of private or public interest, that nothing appears as
incident to an easement but that which is requisite to the fair enjoy-
ment of the right." 2 Certainly in order to navigate, it is not neces-
sary to use the beach except at established landing places. At low
tide the waters are further removed from the land, at high tide they
come nearer, but the highway over them remains the same; it shifts
but does not change its character, nor is the right of the people to
pass in boats interfered with; the use of the dry beach is hardly
"requisite to its fair enjoyment".
Probably if it had not been for the adoption of the theory of a
royal private ownership of the seashore, evolving, as a result of the
American Revolution, into a state or public ownership, there would
have been no ostensible basis upon which to advance a claim of
public usage in and to what essentially had always been private
property. This is clearly indicated in the case of a fresh water or non-
tidal beach, title to which goes with the upland, and although the
waters over such a beach, if naviagble, are subject to the lublic
right of navigation or jus publicum, there are no public rights to the
use of the beach itself.9" To the attempt, therefore, of a tyrannous
king to despoil individual Englishmen of their tidewater beaches,
we can trace the genesis of the claim to a public easement, while
"0Hiscock, 3., in his dissenting opinion in the Brookhaven case (supra, ni. 43
at p. 9o-91), clearly sets forth this distinction, even to the different legal remedies
showing that as to a structure on the beach which did not interfere with naviga-
tion, the king could have it removed as a purpresture upon his private land,
whereasifit interfere with navgation it could be abated as a public nisance.
"People v. N. Y. & S. I. Ferry Co., supra, n. 61.
92Comm. of Canal Fund v. Kempshall, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 404, 414 (1841).
92aLedyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 102, 1o7 (1862).
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theories born of this exercise of the divine right of kings wherewith to
curtail individual enjoyment have become, by involution, and under
the exigencies of an industrialized democracy, arguments, pro bono
publico. If, as has been asserted, but apparently not as yet decided
in this state, the jus publicum is not merely the right of navigation
but includes access to and passage along the shore, with or without
the incidents of bathing, etc., there would in time cease to exist
anything resembling a private beach, except in the barren sense of
the naked title thereto.
THE POLICE POWER AND THE SEASHORE
Echoing the minority utterance of Best, J., in the Blundell case9" to
the effect that public convenience and necessity demand that the
beach, even though privately owned, be impressed with a servitude in
favor of the people, is the expression of opinion in a recent article in
which the suggestion is made that the Jus publicum is really the
police power of the state to be exercised over the beach for the public
benefit.H Such a view abandons the effort to sustain historically
the jus publicum as a right of property; it ignores precedent and con-
siderations of title and proceeds on a distinctly pragmatic basis.
In entertaining such a view we must assume legislative action on the
theory that the beach is imperatively identified with the public
health, safety, morals, or welfare, and if in addition the seashore can
be classed as monopolistic because of the limitation of supply9" in con-
junction with the demands of population, the police power theory is
at least tenable. Thus considered the issue becomes one between a
private exclusive enjoyment based upon an authenticated title and
the claim that the public at large should participate in such enjoyment
because of the social requirements of the situation. Such an issue
directly reflects the ever-growing conflict between an individual
philosophy, the ultimate basis of private land ownership, and its ar-
dent opponent, the school of sociological jurisprudence. As Mr.
Cardozo expresses it, "Men are saying today that property, like
every other social institution, has a social function to fulfill." 96
In this respect, the idea of public convenience specifically rejected in
favor of an exclusive private use by Abbott, Ch. J., in the Blundell
case over one hundred years ago, finds its reverse counterpart in the
prevailing opinion of the Court of Appeals in a recent case. Thus do
93Supra, n. 57.94Parsons, Public and Private Rights in the Seashore, supra, n. 53, at p. 719.
95Wyman, Special Laws of Public Service Corporations: Limitation of sites as
affecting question of monopoly, ch. iii, sees. 9o-96.96Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 87.
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the dissenting opinions of yesterday become the law of to-morrow.
Pound, J., speaking for this court, upholding an act of the legisla-
ture regulating the rentals of private property in New York City,7
says :-
"* * *The Legislative or police power is a dynamic agency,
vague and indefinite in its scope, which takes private property
or limits its use when great public needs require, uncontrolled by
the constitutional requirement of due process. Either the rights
of property and contract must, when necessary, yield to the
public convenience, advantage and welfare, or it must be found
that the State has surrendered one of the attributes of sover-
eignty for which governments are founded, and made itself
powerless to secure to its citizens the blessings of freedom and
to promote the general welfare. * * * The question comes
back to what the State may do for the benefit of the community
at large. * * * The struggle to meet changing conditions through
new legislation constantly goes on. The fundamental question
is whether society is prepared for the change. The law of each age
is ultimately what that age thinks should be the law. * * * While
some may question whether it may be said without exaggera-
tion that these enactments promote the public health or morals
or safety they do in a measurable degree promote the conven-
ience of many, which is the public convenience and the public
welfare and advantage * * *."
Under the fair inference of such language would it be a far step for
this court to uphold an act of the legislature declaring privately
owned beaches in the vicinity of New York City subject to a public
use on the ground that such action was for the convenience, welfare,
and advantage of many people? Short, however, of such legislative
action and judicial support thereof, it is concluded that the sea-
shore under existing common law is restricted to a private use where
privately owned as is the upland9 . If such is the law to-day it has for
its basis the principle of order and system and the authority of
"history and philosophy and custom" 5'--it is the static conception of
property. It is still open for another age to invoke a different method
primarily involving considerations of social utility and dynamic
97People v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429 (1921).
97aThe discussion herein merely attempts to state the law as it is and not to
rationalize with reference to a public participation in the seashore. While the
conclusion reached is that the legal mechanism of an easement in privately owned
seashore in favor of the public cannot be found in or deduced from the "traditional
materials", it would be hazardous to infer in an age given to the "socialization of
law", that the door is therefore completely closed. Judicial origination based
upon the police power or some newer theory of property, as yetunformulatedin
our legal system, may upset the traditional status. This has been recently indi-
cated by a recognized jurist (Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 192i,
pp. 186, 196, I99).9sCardozo, supra, n. 96, p. 65.
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aspects of ownership, This would be invoking "the method of
sociology"-a method which "bends symmetry, ignores history and
sacrifices custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends."99 Whether
the different rule thus to be reached would subserve the profound
and ultimate needs of society, "the final cause of law", 00 is at least
open to doubt; it is, in any event, a question of unknown and relative
values for philosophic inquiry and experimental appraisement.
Such a question does not fall within the present survey.10 '
99Idem, p. 66.
1l°Idem, p. 67.1"'If there is a public need for the beaches, there is, of course, always the power
of eminent domain; the state may condemn and so obtain upon rendering com-
pensation.
